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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Heilman v. Courtney, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided that a 
person convicted of a felony-level Driving While Intoxicated offense (felony DWI) 
is “released from prison” under Minnesota statute when he departs from prison to 
participate in Phase II of the Challenge Incarceration Program.1 The court made 
this determination based on the language in the felony-DWI conditional release 
statute and the statutes governing the Challenge Incarceration Program.2 Justice 
Lillehaug issued a strong dissent to the majority’s decision, noting that the majority 
strayed from the legislative intent behind the aforementioned statutes and other 
relevant statutes.3  
                                                           
*Claire Gutknecht is a Juris Doctor Candidate for 2021 at Mitchell Hamline School of Law. 
She is a second-year law student working for the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office in the 
Adult Prosecution Division. She previously worked at a federal re-entry center, and that 
experience spurred her to pursue a career as an attorney and ignited her passion for criminal 
justice reform.   
1 Heilman v. Courtney, 926 N.W.2d 387, 396–97 (Minn. 2019) (discussing section 
169A.276, subdivision 1(d), and section 244.172, subdivision 2, of the 2018 Minnesota 
Statutes and their interplay in determining when a person’s mandatory conditional release 
term will begin). 
2 See id. at 404–08 (opinion attachment) (providing Policies, Directives and Instructions 
Manual, MINN. DEP’T OF CORR. div. directive 204.060 (Nov. 7, 2017) (promulgating in-
depth instructions for how the Challenge Incarceration Program should be implemented)). 
3 Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 400–02 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting) (“The court’s interpretation 
makes the statute less effective and uniform. It gives some people convicted of first-degree 
2
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This case note begins with the relevant statutory history and case law 
underlying the Heilman decision. Next, it describes the facts, relevant procedural 
history, and the court’s ultimate ruling in Heilman. The analysis demonstrates the 
court’s error in failing to engage in a complete statutory interpretation. The case 
note then engages in a complete statutory analysis to explain what should have 
occurred in Heilman. Additionally, the analysis argues that the court’s 
determination in Heilman possibly leads to an equal protection violation.  
II. CASE LAW AND STATUTORY HISTORY INFORMING THE HEILMAN 
DECISION 
A. Statutory History 
In Minnesota, a fixed executed sentence for a felony-level offense must 
“consist[] of two parts: (1) a specified minimum term of imprisonment that is equal 
to two-thirds of the executed sentence; and (2) a specified maximum supervised 
release term that is equal to one-third of the executed sentence.”4 If people violate 
prison rules or refuse to participate in treatment programs while incarcerated, they 
may spend more time imprisoned than the required two-thirds minimum as a 
punishment for those violations.5  
Supervised release occurs after a person completes a term of 
imprisonment and is released from prison.6 The supervised release term must be 
equal to the time remaining in a person’s executed sentence after completion of the 
minimum term of imprisonment.7 People cannot spend more than one-third of 
their executed sentence on supervised release or in the community because, at 
minimum, two-thirds of an executed sentence must be served in prison.8 While on 
supervised release, people must follow certain rules, comply with standards adopted 
by the Commissioner of Corrections, and follow rules promulgated by the judicial 
official at the time of sentencing.9 If supervised release terms are violated, people 
are subject to sanctions for those violations.10 Sanctions for supervised release 
violations range from a restructuring of supervised release requirements to 
                                                           
DWI an early start on their conditional-release terms and disconnects those terms from the 
supervised-release terms. This discrepancy undermines the system of mandatory penalties 
the Legislature enacted to remedy a serious problem.”). 
4 MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subdiv. 1 (2019). 
5 See id.; MINN. STAT. § 244.05, subdiv. 1b(a) (2019); MINN. R. 2940.1600 (2019).  
6 MINN. STAT. § 244.05, subdiv. 1. 
7 Id. subdiv. 1b(a). For example, if a defendant is sentenced to a sixty-month executed 
sentence, the defendant would serve two-thirds of that time (forty months) in prison; upon 
release, the defendant would spend the remaining one-third of the executed sentence (twenty 
months) on supervised release. See id.  
8 Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subdiv. 1. 
9 MINN. STAT. § 244.05, subdiv. 2. 
10 Id. subdiv. 3. 
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reimprisonment for the remainder of the supervised release term, which is 
equivalent to the time remaining in the original executed sentence.11  
In addition to supervised release, some felony-level offenses in Minnesota 
require a mandatory conditional release term.12 At issue in Heilman was the 
statutorily mandated conditional release term for felony DWI offenses.13 Under this 
statute, any person whose prison sentence is executed after a felony DWI 
conviction must serve a five-year conditional release term after being released from 
prison.14 Like supervised release, felony DWI conditional release can be revoked 
for violations, which results in the person serving all or a portion of the remaining 
conditional release term in prison, even if the minimum term of imprisonment has 
already been completed.15 People with felony DWI convictions are mandated by 
statute to serve both a five-year conditional release term and the statutorily 
mandated supervised release term upon their release from prison.16  
Conditional release terms are governed by the same provisions as 
supervised release terms.17 Both conditional release and supervised release are types 
of community supervision.18 During this period of supervision, people are required 
to abide by the conditions imposed by the state in order to maintain their freedom 
from incarceration.19 The Commissioner of Corrections adopts standards and 
procedures for revocation of supervised and conditional release.20 However, the 
imposed conditions under either type of supervision vary on a case-by-case basis.21 
There are a number of standard conditions of supervised release, including: 
reporting to supervising agents after release from prison, maintaining continuous 
contact with the supervising agent, abstaining from using intoxicants or drugs, and 
                                                           
11 Id.; see also State ex rel. Pollard v. Roy, 878 N.W.2d 341, 343 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016). The 
type of sanctions probationers receive generally depends on the severity of their violation 
and whether they have had prior probation violations. There is no right to a formal hearing 
to ascertain whether a release violation has occurred prior to receiving a sanction. See 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972).  
12 See MINN. STAT. § 169A.276, subdiv. 1(d) (2019) (mandating a five-year term of 
conditional release for persons convicted of felony-level DWI); MINN. STAT. § 609.3455, 
subdiv. 6 (2019) (mandating a conditional release term for eligible people convicted of sex 
offenses); State v. Bluhm, 676 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Minn. 2004) (indicating that the language 
in the felony DWI statute makes conditional release compulsory in cases where a prison 
sentence will be executed). 
13 Heilman v. Courtney, 926 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Minn. 2019). 
14 MINN. STAT. § 169A.276, subdiv. 1(d); see also Bushey v. State, No. A07-0787, 2008 WL 
1868079, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2008). 
15 See MINN. STAT. § 169A.276, subdiv. 1(d). 
16 See MINN. STAT. § 244.05, subdiv. 1 (2019) (mandating convicted persons to serve a 
supervised release term not exceeding the length of time remaining on their sentence); MINN. 
STAT. § 169A.276, subdiv. 1(d) (requiring that people convicted of felony DWI serve a five-
year term of conditional release). 
17 See MINN. STAT. §§ 169A.276, 244.05 (2019) (providing the requirements of supervised 
release). 
18 Cecelia Klingele, Criminal Law: Rethinking the Use of Community Supervision, 103 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1015, 1021 (2013). 
19 Id.  
20 MINN. STAT. § 244.05, subdiv. 2. 
21 Klingele, supra note 18, at 1033–36. 
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remaining law-abiding.22 However, individuals may be subject to more conditions 
directly reflecting their individualized needs because the sentencing judge and 
Commissioner of Corrections can mandate different conditions.23 
B. Work Release and the Challenge Incarceration Program 
Prior to release from prison, people may choose to participate in different 
programs during their term of incarceration.24 Two such programs are the Challenge 
Incarceration Program (Bootcamp) and the Work Release Program (Work 
Release).25  Bootcamp consists of three phases.26 Phase I lasts a minimum of 180 
days and requires participants to undergo a highly structured and rigorous 
bootcamp-like scenario in which targeted and individualized programming must be 
completed.27 Additionally, Phase I must occur at one of the designated Minnesota 
Correctional Institutions.28  
In Phase II, which lasts at least six months, participants depart from prison 
to intensely-supervised home confinement, where they must participate in forty 
hours of a “pre-approved constructive activity” such as work, school, or 
volunteering.29 This intense supervision includes regular drug testing, daily reporting 
to a supervising agent, and any other conditions imposed by the Commissioner of 
Corrections.30 During Phase II, participants can eventually gain privileges like pre-
approved social activities and visitation.31  
Phase III, Bootcamp’s final phase, extends until the Commissioner of 
Corrections determines the participant has completed Bootcamp successfully or 
until the participant’s sentence expires.32 In Phase III, participants are able to act as 
though they are on supervised release, although the formal transfer has not yet 
                                                           
22 MINN. R. 2940.2000 (2019). Other conditions include informing the supervising agent of 
address changes and contact with law enforcement, not possessing firearms or dangerous 
weapons, and remaining in the state unless the supervised person has permission to leave. 
Id.  
23 See MINN. STAT. § 244.05, subdiv. 2. 
24 MINN. STAT. §§ 244.17–.173 (2019) (creating and governing the Challenge Incarceration 
Program, which eligible incarcerated persons may elect to participate in with permission from 
the Commissioner of Corrections); see also MINN. STAT. § 241.26 (2019) (allowing eligible 
incarcerated persons to participate in the Work Release program with permission from the 
Commissioner of Corrections). 
25 MINN. STAT. §§ 244.17–.173, 241.26. 
26 MINN. STAT. § 244.172 (describing the various phases in the Challenge Incarceration 
Program). 
27 MINN. STAT. § 244.172, subdiv. 1. 
28 Id. (requiring participants to “be confined at the Minnesota Correctional Facility—Willow 
River/Moose Lake or the Minnesota Correctional Facility—Togo” while completing Phase 
I). 
29 Id. subdiv. 2; Heilman v. Courtney, 926 N.W.2d 387, 412 (citing Policies, Directives and 
Instructions Manual, MINN. DEP’T OF CORR. div. directive 204.061 (July 26, 2016)).  
30 MINN. STAT. § 244.172, subdiv. 2. 
31 Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 412. 
32 MINN. STAT. § 244.172, subdiv. 3.  
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occurred.33 The participants are no longer under the intensive supervision that is 
characteristic of Phase II. Instead, they begin to act like normal parolees.34  
If a participant completes Phase III successfully, the supervising agent may 
apply for an early release, and if the Commissioner of Corrections approves, the 
participant may be transferred to supervised release for the remainder of the term 
of incarceration.35 At any time during Phase II or Phase III, participants can be 
removed from the program and returned to prison for failing to comply with 
program rules.36 
Work Release allows the Commissioner of Corrections to conditionally 
release eligible people to work, seek employment, or participate in vocational or 
educational training in the community.37 Work Release is comparable to Phase II 
of Bootcamp, as participants are released to a location pre-approved by the 
Commissioner of Corrections.38 This location could be a halfway house, treatment 
facility, or the person’s residence.39  
Like Bootcamp participants, Work Release participants are required to 
abide by certain conditions and rules established by the Commissioner of 
Corrections.40 For example, participants cannot use any mood-altering substances, 
must be under close supervision, and provide regular breath and urine samples to 
ensure sobriety.41 Work Release participants must also complete transitional 
programs and treatment programs like Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics 
Anonymous.42 Like Bootcamp participants, Work Release participants may 
eventually gain access to limited privileges like social passes.43 However, prior to 
obtaining privileges, participants must have followed all program rules and 
maintained steady employment.44 If participants regress or do not comply with 
Work Release rules, their privileges may be revoked, and they may be sent back to 
prison to complete the remainder of their term of imprisonment.45 
Both programs are voluntary incarceration programs, meaning, people 
must volunteer to participate in the programs rather than being randomly selected 
                                                           
33 Id. 
34 See id.; Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 412–13. 
35 MINN. STAT. § 244.172, subdiv. 3. Thus, people could be allowed to transfer to supervised 
release prior to completing their minimum term of imprisonment, resulting in an early 
release. See MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subdiv. 1 (2019); Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 409, 412–
13.  
36 See MINN. STAT. § 244.172, subdiv. 3; Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 412. 
37 MINN. STAT. § 241.26, subdiv. 1 (2019). 
38 Id. subdiv. 2.  
39 Id. (providing more information about the housing options participants have while on 
Work Release). 
40 Id. subdiv. 3. 
41 MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., FACT SHEET: WORK RELEASE PROGRAM 1 (2019), https://mn.gov
/doc/assets/Work%20Release_tcm1089-309002.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9J8-W2X8].  
42 Id.  
43 MINN. STAT. § 241.26, subdiv. 3 (2019); MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 41, at 2. 
44 MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 41, at 2. 
45 Id.  
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by the Commissioner of Corrections.46 Bootcamp participants must have at least 
thirteen months remaining in their term of imprisonment.47 Work Release 
participants must have at least twelve months remaining in their term of 
imprisonment.48 Both programs require program staff to screen applications to 
determine if the applicant is a good candidate for structured transitional release.49 
Both programs prevent people with certain characteristics or offenses from 
participating in the program.50 For example, people currently serving time for an 
out-of-state sentence and those required to register as predatory offenders are 
barred from participating in either program.51 
C. Common Law History 
There are several Minnesota precedents regarding the intersection of 
felony DWI conditional release, incarceration programs, and supervised release. 
First, in State v. Calmes, the Minnesota Supreme Court determined that conditional 
release is constitutional and does not constitute multiple punishments for the same 
offense; rather, conditional release is a part of the mandated punishment for certain 
crimes.52 In general, conditional release is meant to provide continuous supervision 
in the community after a person is released from prison.53 This is accomplished 
because individuals on community-based supervision remain in legal custody of the 
state as they are subject to reincarceration for any breach of a release condition, 
even after completion of their term of imprisonment.54 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals has repeatedly indicated that supervised 
release and conditional release can be concurrent to each other if the statutory 
language supports a concurrent application of the two.55 More specifically, in Maiers 
                                                           
46 Heilman v. Courtney, 926 N.W.2d 387, 404–05 (attaching Policies, Directives and 
Instructions Manual, MINN. DEP’T OF CORR. Div. Directive 204.060 (Nov. 7, 2017)); 
Policies, Directives and Instructions Manual, MINN. DEP’T OF CORR. div. directive 
205.120(B)(2) (Dec. 18, 2018) http://www.doc.state.mn.us/DocPolicy2/html/
DPW_Display_TOC.asp?Opt=205.120.htm [https://perma.cc/G4H4-S5D5]. 
47 Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 404 (attaching Policies, Directives and Instructions Manual, 
MINN. DEP’T OF CORR. div. directive 204.060 (Nov. 7, 2017)). 
48 MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 46, div. directive 205.120(B)(1). 
49 Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 405; see also MINN. DEP’T OF CORR. div. directive 205.120, supra 
note 46. 
50 Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 404; see also MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 46, div. directive 
205.120(B)(3). 
51 Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 404; see also MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 46, div. directive 
205.120(B)(3)(d),(h). 
52 State v. Calmes, 632 N.W.2d 641, 649 (Minn. 2001).  
53 See State ex rel. Pollard v. Roy, 878 N.W.2d 341, 347 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016). 
54 See State ex rel. Duncan v. Roy, 887 N.W.2d 271, 276–77 (Minn. 2016); State v. Schwartz, 
628 N.W.2d 134, 139 (Minn. 2001). 
55 Tillotson v. Minn. Dep’t of Corr., No. A12-1175, 2013 WL 1788505, at *5 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Apr. 29, 2013) (explaining that conditional release and supervised release will 
necessarily run concurrently based upon the language in Minnesota Statutes section 
169A.276); State ex rel. Peterson v. Fabian, 784 N.W.2d 843, 847 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) 
(explaining that conditional release and supervised release do not run concurrently when 
statutory language directs that conditional release begin after the completion of sentences 
7
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v. Roy, the court explained that people mandated to serve a five-year conditional 
release term under the felony DWI statute will serve their supervised release and 
conditional release terms concurrently because both supervision terms begin when 
a person is released from prison, as indicated by the statutory language.56 
Additionally, in Pollard v. Roy, the court indicated that a conditional release term 
cannot begin prior to release from prison.57 Furthermore, the court has reinforced 
that conditional release terms are compulsory and for a fixed period.58 In the case 
of a felony DWI conviction, the term must be five years.59  
In Duncan v. Roy, the court extrapolated further, explaining that 
participants cannot receive credit towards their conditional release term for time 
spent incarcerated if there is a supervised release violation and revocation.60 This 
time cannot be credited towards conditional release, as conditional release and 
supervised release are meant to be served in the community; whereas, when people 
are revoked from community-supervision, they are in custody.61  
In Huseby v. Roy, the court determined that a person’s transfer from 
prison to Work Release does not constitute a release from prison.62 Thus, under 
the felony DWI statute, a person’s conditional release term is not triggered when 
he or she departs from prison to participate in Work Release.63 The court reached 
this decision after an analysis of relevant Minnesota statutes.64 These statutes 
mandate that two-thirds of an executed sentence be served in prison.65 As such, 
when people depart for Work Release, they are still serving their mandated 
                                                           
that are followed by a period of supervised release); State v. Koperski, 611 N.W.2d 569, 572 
(Minn. Ct App. 2000) (holding that legislative intent and relevant case law clearly indicate 
that supervised release and conditional release terms are to run concurrently), abrogated on 
other grounds by State ex rel. Pollard v. Roy, 878 N.W.2d 341, 349–50 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2016); State v. Enger, 539 N.W.2d 259, 263 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that time spent 
on supervised release must be subtracted from the conditional release term). 
56 Maiers v. Roy, 847 N.W.2d 524, 531 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014). Note that the court does not 
mandate this in every circumstance; rather, holding only that this is the necessary result when 
sections 244.05 and 169A.276 of the Minnesota Statutes are read together. Id. 
57 Pollard, 878 N.W.2d at 348 (citing State v. Wukawitz, 662 N.W.2d 517, 525 (Minn. 2003). 
58 Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 169A.276, subdiv. 1(d) (2019) (describing the compulsory 
nature of the five-year fixed conditional release term for felony DWI). 
59 MINN. STAT. § 169A.276, subdiv. 1(d). 
60 State ex rel. Duncan v. Roy, 887 N.W.2d 271, 278–79 (Minn. 2016). In contrast to 
Heilman, the petitioner in Duncan was serving time and was mandated to serve on 
conditional release for a sex-offense based on the now-obsolete section 609.109, subdivision 
7(a), of the Minnesota Statutes. See Duncan, 887 N.W.2d at 272.  
61 See id. at 276–77. 
62 State ex rel. Huseby v. Roy, 903 N.W.2d 633, 638 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017). The petitioner 
in this case was serving time and was assigned mandatory conditional release under 
section 169A.276, subdivision 1(d), of the Minnesota Statutes, making his circumstances 
identical to Heilman’s. Huseby, 903 N.W.2d at 634.  
63 Huseby, 903 N.W.2d at 638; see also MINN. STAT. § 169A.276. 
64 Huseby, 903 N.W.2d at 636. 
65 Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subdiv. 1 (2019); MINN. STAT. § 244.05, subdiv. 1b(a) 
(2019). 
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minimum term of imprisonment.66 The court determined that Work Release 
participants are still incarcerated even while residing outside of the prison walls.67 
Given this determination, Work Release participants cannot begin their conditional 
release or supervised release terms because they have not been “release[d] from 
prison” under the felony DWI statute.68 
III. CASE SUMMARY 
A. Facts and Procedural Posture 
On September 13, 2004, Donald Heilman was sentenced to a stayed 
fifty-one-month prison sentence, followed by five years of conditional release.69 As 
his sentence was stayed, Heilman was placed on probation. On May 22, 2007, the 
State revoked Heilman’s probation and executed his stayed prison sentence, 
meaning he was required to serve time in prison.70 In December 2007, Heilman 
opted to participate in Bootcamp and began Phase I.71  
Heilman completed Phase I of Bootcamp in July 2008, at which point he 
departed from the prison to his home to complete Phase II under intensive house 
arrest supervision.72 Heilman completed Phase II in January 2009 and continued 
on to Phase III of Bootcamp.73 However, Heilman failed to remain sober and 
regressed back to Phase II in April 2009.74 Heilman again failed to remain sober 
and after a few months was removed from the Bootcamp program altogether and 
sent back to prison to serve the remainder of his sentence.75  
After serving two-thirds of his fifty-one-month sentence, Heilman was 
released from prison on December 27, 2010, and began his mandated conditional 
and supervised release terms.76 Heilman was arrested on March 12, 2014, for failing 
to complete inpatient chemical dependency treatment, which was a condition of his 
supervised release.77 At a probation hearing on March 25, 2014, Heilman’s 
supervised release was revoked for 180 days as a sanction for his failure to complete 
                                                           
66 See Huseby, 903 N.W.2d at 636–37; see also MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subdiv. 1; MINN. 
STAT. § 244.05, subdiv. 1b(a). 
67 Huseby, 903 N.W.2d at 637; see also MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subdiv. 1; MINN. STAT. 
§ 244.05, subdiv. 1b(a). 
68 MINN. STAT. § 169A.276, subdiv. 1(d); Huseby, 903 N.W.2d at 636–37 (citing MINN. 
STAT. §§ 244.05, subdiv. 1, 244.065). 
69 Heilman v. Courtney, 926 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Minn. 2019). Heilman was convicted for 
first-degree driving while impaired. Under the statute, Minnesota courts can refrain from 
imposing or executing a prison sentence. MINN. STAT. § 609.135, subdiv. 2 (2019). 
70 Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 390. 
71 Id.; see also MINN. STAT. §§ 244.17–.173 (2019). 
72 Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 390. 
73 Id. 
74 Id.  
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 390–91. 
77 Id. at 391.  
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inpatient treatment.78 The Department of Corrections released Heilman on May 
14, 2014, after he served only 63 days of the 180-day sanction.79 Unfortunately, the 
Department of Corrections did not document the purpose for this release.80  
Heilman filed a complaint in July 2016 against the Department of 
Corrections, asserting false imprisonment and negligence claims.81 Heilman 
claimed his five-year conditional release term under the felony DWI statute began 
when he left prison to begin Phase II of Bootcamp on July 9, 2008.82 Heilman 
believed his five-year conditional release term should have expired in July 2013.83 
Therefore, Heilman argued that the sixty-three days he served as a sanction from 
March 2014 to May 2014 constituted unlawful incarceration.84  
The district court granted the State’s motion for judgment on the pleadings 
and dismissed Heilman’s claims with prejudice as he had failed to establish that the 
Department of Corrections intentionally caused his confinement beyond his release 
date or that it owed him a duty.85 Furthermore, the court found the Department of 
Corrections was justified in incarcerating Heilman, which is a valid defense to false 
imprisonment, absolving the Department of Corrections from any guilt.86  
Heilman appealed, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the 
district court’s decision as it determined that Heilman’s conditional release was 
properly revoked.87 The court also addressed the meaning of “released from 
prison,” explaining that when a person is released from prison after completing 
Phase I of Bootcamp, he or she is not released from custody.88 Furthermore, the 
court indicated that conditional release and supervised release are both mandated 
to begin at the time a person is released from prison.89 Thus, because Heilman’s 
supervised release began in December 2010 when he was released after serving two-
thirds of his executed fifty-one-month sentence, he would remain on conditional 
release until December 2015.90 Heilman petitioned the Minnesota Supreme Court 
for review, which was granted.91  
                                                           
78 Id. Inpatient treatment was one of the required conditions of Heilman’s supervised release, 
violation of which allowed the revocation of such release. See id.  
79 Id. 
80 Id. Justice Thissen’s dissent noted that the failure to record the purpose of release was 
alarming for a multitude of reasons. Id. at 402–03 (Thissen, J., dissenting).  
81 Id. at 391. 
82 Id. 
83 Id.  
84 Id. 
85 Id.  
86 Id.  
87 Id. (“The court first reclassified the district court’s order as a grant of summary judgment 
because the parties relied on documents outside the pleadings.” (citing Heilman v. Courtney, 
906 N.W.2d 521, 524 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017))).  
88 Heilman, 906 N.W.2d at 525. This determination was based on the interplay of section 
169A.276, subdivision 1(d) and section 244.172, subdivision 2 of the Minnesota Statutes. 
89 Heilman, 906 N.W.2d at 525–26; see also Huseby, 903 N.W.2d at 636–38. 
90 Heilman, 906 N.W.2d at 526. 
91 Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 392. Heilman argued that the appellate court, in addition to its 
misinterpretation, had inappropriately reviewed the statute—an issue that had not been raised 
in district court. Id.  
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B. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision and Reasoning 
Before the Minnesota Supreme Court, Heilman argued that his claims 
should not have been dismissed.92 The court addressed two issues: (1) whether the 
court of appeals erred when it engaged in statutory interpretation; and (2) whether 
a person convicted of a DWI is released from prison under the felony DWI statute 
when he or she begins Phase II of Bootcamp.93 This case note focuses on the 
supreme court’s determination that conditional release begins when Phase II of 
Bootcamp begins.94 
The court reviewed the appellate court’s statutory interpretation analysis 
de novo.95 It began by explaining that the purpose of statutory interpretation is to 
determine and fulfill the legislative intent behind the statute.96 If legislative intent is 
based on plain meaning, then the statute should be interpreted according to plain 
meaning.97  
The court looked at a series of statutes and determined that the language 
in the statutory scheme does not mandate for conditional release and supervised 
release to begin simultaneously, meaning the two types of release do not have to 
run concurrently.98 To arrive at this conclusion, the court relied on Duncan v. Roy, 
which held that the plain meaning of the word “release” is “to [be] set free from 
confinement or bondage.”99 The court adopted this same definition of “release” in 
the felony DWI statute such that an individual who is “set free” from prison begins 
conditional release at that point.100 Heilman’s departure for Phase II of Bootcamp 
was considered a release from prison as he was “set free” from prison.101 Thus, 
Heilman’s conditional release term began when he was released from prison to 
begin Phase II of Bootcamp in July 2008, meaning his term of imprisonment 
should have expired in July 2013.102 
The court believed this interpretation was supported by Bootcamp’s 
structure because Phase I requires confinement, but Phase II must expressly take 
place in the community.103 In Phase II, participants are not confined despite the 
                                                           
92 Id. 
93 Id. The court addressed this first issue regarding Heilman’s argument that the appellate 
court had inappropriately engaged in statutory interpretation when that issue had not been 
raised in district court. Id. The court ultimately determined the court of appeals had not 
erred because even though Heilman did not cite to the statute, it was the primary source of 
his argument in district court and the State had cited to the statute in its response to 
Heilman’s argument. Id. Thus, the issue was properly before both the court of appeals and 
the present court. Id.  
94 Id. at 397–98; MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2019). 
95 Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 393. 
96 Id. at 394. 
97 Id.; MINN. STAT. § 645.16. 
98 Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 394–96 (citing MINN. STAT. § 169A.276, subdiv. 1(d) (2019); 
MINN. STAT. §§ 244.171–.173 (2019)). 
99 Id. at 394 (citing State ex rel. Duncan v. Roy, 887 N.W.2d 271, 277 (Minn. 2016)).  
100 Id.  
101 Id. at 395. 
102 Id. at 390, 395. 
103 Id. at 395. 
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intense supervised release.104 Thus, while in Phase II, participants are released from 
prison because they have been “set free from confinement or bondage.”105  
The court offered three pieces of evidence to bolster its decision.106 First, 
the court referred to the Department of Corrections’ paperwork reflecting 
Heilman’s conditional release revocation in September 2009, which clearly showed 
that his conditional release began prior to the completion of his term of 
imprisonment in December 2010.107 Second, the court explained that Bootcamp is 
an exception from the general statutory scheme and legislative mandate, allowing 
for release to occur before the completion of a person’s sentence.108 Third, the court 
indicated that Bootcamp is voluntary and requires people to sign contracts to opt 
into the program.109 Thus, the incentive and benefit people receive for participation 
in Bootcamp is the potential of an early release from prison.110 The court believed 
this provided support for the premise that conditional release would begin when a 
participant is released for Phase II because this would constitute an early release.111 
 Justice Lillehaug issued a persuasive dissent. He argued that the majority’s 
plain-meaning interpretation of the phrase “release from prison” was inappropriate 
because the phrase is ambiguous.112 Thus, according to Justice Lillehaug, the 
majority should have engaged in a complete statutory interpretation analysis.113 He 
reasoned that, after a full statutory interpretation analysis, the court likely would 
have concluded that the court of appeals’ interpretation of the phrase was the most 
persuasive because it most fully embodied the legislative intent.114  
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Heilman court came to the incorrect conclusion because it failed to 
engage in a complete statutory analysis given the ambiguity in the statute. Had the 
court engaged in this analysis, the surrounding statutes, case law, and policies would 
have led the court to conclude that supervised release should not begin when a 
Bootcamp participant leaves for Phase II of Bootcamp. Moreover, the court’s 
                                                           
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 394–95 (citing State ex rel. Duncan v. Roy, 887 N.W.2d 271, 277 (Minn. 2016)).  
106 Id. at 397–98. 
107 Id. at 397 (“That the Department revoked Heilman’s ‘conditional release’ in 2009 implies 
that Heilman did not begin his conditional-release term in 2010 . . . . That which has not yet 
begun cannot be revoked.”). 
108 Id. at 397–98. (“As Heilman persuasively points out, ‘that’s the point of the [Bootcamp]—
an early release from prison before the term of imprisonment has expired.’ Presumably, 
felons understand this advantage, which is why they voluntarily choose to participate in the 
Program and its boot camp.”).  
109  Id. at 397. 
110 Id. at 397–98. 
111 Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 244.172, subdiv. 1(a) (2019). 
112 Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 400 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting). 
113 Id. at 401 (“If a statute is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation, it is 
ambiguous[,] and we may resort to the canons of construction or legislative history to 
determine the intent of the Legislature.” (quoting State ex. rel. Duncan v. Roy, 887 N.W.2d 
271, 276 (Minn. 2016))).  
114 Id. at 401–02. 
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decision in Heilman creates a plausible equal protection violation because it creates 
a circumstance where similarly situated persons are treated in an unequal manner.  
A. Statutory Interpretation Analysis  
The central point of contention in Heilman v. Courtney was how 
the phrase “released from prison” within the felony DWI statute should be 
interpreted as applied to Heilman’s circumstances.115 Statutory 
interpretation is a task courts are well-equipped to perform and one they 
engage in regularly.116 Proper statutory interpretation is imperative because 
courts have the duty to effectuate legislative intent when determining what 
behavior to criminalize and which punishments to apply.117  
Heilman and the State provided different opinions on how the 
phrase “release from prison” should be interpreted.118 Heilman believed a 
person’s departure from prison as a part of Bootcamp fell within the 
statutory meaning of “released from prison.”119 The State argued that the 
statute was ambiguous and needed to be interpreted to determine how it 
should apply to Bootcamp participants.120 Nonetheless, the court engaged in 
surface-level statutory interpretation to determine how the phrase “release 
from prison” should be defined and applied to Heilman’s circumstances.121  
1. Process Courts Utilize to Perform Statutory Interpretation and the 
Purpose of Statutory Interpretation 
Minnesota has a network of statutes and case law that provide 
guidance on how courts should approach statutory interpretation issues. 
Statutory interpretation questions are resolved using the de novo standard 
                                                           
115 Id. at 389. This interpretation was necessary to determine when Heilman’s conditional 
release term started because the felony DWI statute mandates conditional release to begin 
upon a person’s “release from prison.” Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 169A.276 (2018)). 
116 Courts regularly engage in statutory interpretation as the American system mandates 
separation of powers, meaning legislatures make and pass laws and courts authoritatively 
interpret those laws. SHAMBIE SINGER & NORMAN J. SINGER, The Function of Interpretation, 
in SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45:3 (7th ed. 2019); see also 
State v. Meyer, 37 N.W.2d 3, 9 (Minn. 1949) (indicating the legislature has always had the 
power to fix and determine the punishments that should be imposed for violations of the 
law); State v. Miller, No. 02-CR-15-3913, 2017 WL 2729608, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. June 26, 
2017) (“The legislature is vested with power to define criminal conduct and to determine the 
punishment for such conduct.” (citing State v. Olson, 325 N.W.2d 13, 17–18 (Minn. 1982))). 
117 See Olson, 325 N.W.2d at 17–18; SINGER & SINGER, supra note 116. 
118 Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 393. 
119 Id. During Phase II of the Bootcamp, participants reside in the community under house 
arrest and intense supervision. MINN. STAT. §§ 244.171–.173 (2019).  
120 Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 393. 
121 Id. at 394.   
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of review.122 The central purpose of all statutory interpretation is to 
“ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.”123  
With the central purpose of effectuating the intent of the legislature, 
“[t]he first step in statutory interpretation is to determine whether the statute 
is ambiguous on its face.”124 “A statute is ambiguous only when the statutory 
language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.”125 Courts 
can “assume that the legislature enacts statutes ‘with full knowledge of prior 
legislation on the same subject.’”126 Multiple parts of a statute can be read in 
conjunction to determine ambiguity.127 This is a necessary first step because, 
if legislative intent is discernible based on a statute’s unambiguous language, 
courts must apply the statute’s plain meaning and no further interpretation 
is necessary.128 Alternatively, if a court concludes statutory language is 
ambiguous, it should conduct a complete statutory interpretation analysis.129  
When interpreting a statute, courts must consider “other laws on 
the same subject, the purpose of the law, the consequences of a particular 
interpretation, and administrative and legislative interpretations of the 
statute.”130 The presumption is that the legislature does not intend an absurd 
result in the enforcement of a statute.131 Statutes must be construed in their 
entirety to give effect to all of their provisions.132 They must be considered 
in totality because reading a statute in isolation can lead to absurd results 
unintended by the legislature.133 “Moreover, courts should give a reasonable 
and sensible construction to criminal statutes.”134 Words and phrases should 
be interpreted according to their plain and ordinary meanings.135 
Additionally, “no word, phrase, or sentence should be deemed superfluous, 
                                                           
122 See State v. Noggle, 881 N.W.2d 545, 547 (Minn. 2016) (indicating that statutory 
interpretation is a question of law that the court reviews de novo).  
123 MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2019). 
124 State v. Jones, 848 N.W.2d 528, 535 (Minn. 2014). 
125 Id. 
126 State v. Leathers, 799 N.W.2d 606, 609 (Minn. 2011) (quoting Meister v. W. Nat. Mut. 
Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 372, 378 (Minn. 1992)). 
127 Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Minn. 2013); Martin v. Dicklich, 823 
N.W.2d 336, 344 (Minn. 2012). 
128 See Jones, 848 N.W.2d at 535 (“When the Legislature’s intent is discernible from plain 
and unambiguous language, statutory construction is neither necessary nor permitted; and 
courts apply the statute’s plain meaning.”). 
129 Henke, 831 N.W.2d at 537; State v. Peck, 773 N.W.2d 768, 772 (Minn. 2009). 
130 State ex rel. Pollard v. Roy, 878 N.W.2d 341, 344 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016) (citing MINN. 
STAT. § 645.16 (2016)).  
131 MINN. STAT. § 645.17(1) (2019). 
132 Jones, 848 N.W.2d at 535. 
133 State ex rel. Huseby v. Roy, 903 N.W.2d 633, 636 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (citing MINN. 
STAT. §§ 645.08, 645.16, 645.17 (2016)). 
134 State v. Murphy, 545 N.W.2d 909, 916 (Minn. 1996) (citing State v. Suess, 52 N.W.2d 
409, 415 (Minn. 1952)). 
135 Jones, 848 N.W.2d at 535. 
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void or insignificant” in the final interpretation of a statute.136 If the terms 
within a statute are not defined by the statute itself, the court can consider 
other statutes relating to the same subject matter.137  
Statutes from various chapters may need to be interpreted together 
based on the doctrine of in pari materia, which “is a tool of statutory 
interpretation that allows two statutes with common purposes and subject 
matter to be construed together to determine the meaning of ambiguous 
statutory language.”138 If a court has previously interpreted a statute, the past 
interpretation can guide courts in future interpretation of the same statute 
or language.139 Additionally, “an agency’s interpretation of the statutes it 
administers is entitled to deference and should be upheld, absent a finding 
that it conflicts with the express purpose of the Act and the intention of the 
legislature.”140  
2. The Court’s Statutory Interpretation in Heilman Was Incomplete 
and Produced a Result Incongruent with the Legislative Intent  
In Heilman, the court determined the felony DWI statute and the 
phrase “release from prison” contained therein were not ambiguous.141 The 
court resorted to the statute’s plain meaning and determined that a person’s 
“release from prison” under the felony DWI statute is triggered if the 
person departs from prison for Phase II of Bootcamp.142  
a. The Statutory Phrase “Release from Prison” is Ambiguous as It 
Is Reasonably Subject to More Than One Interpretation 
The court’s interpretation of “release from prison” is problematic 
because it ignores both the legislative intent and the phrase’s reasonable 
susceptibility to more than one interpretation. The court’s duty during all 
phases of statutory interpretation must be to “ascertain and effectuate the 
                                                           
136 Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 537, 538 (Minn. 2013) (quoting Amaral v. Saint 
Cloud Hosp., 598 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn. 1999)). 
137 Carlson v. Dep’t of Emp’t and Econ. Dev., 747 N.W.2d 367, 372 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) 
(quoting Hahn v. City of Ortonville, 57 N.W.2d 254, 261 (Minn. 1953)). 
138 State v. Leathers, 799 N.W.2d 606, 611 (Minn. 2011) (quoting State v. Lucas, 589 N.W.2d 
91, 94 (Minn. 1999)). 
139 Henke, 831 N.W.2d at 538. 
140 Frieler v. Carlson Mktg. Grp., 751 N.W.2d 558, 567 (Minn. 2008) (quoting Geo. A. 
Hormel & Co. v. Asper, 428 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1988)); see also Green v. Whirlpool 
Corp., 389 N.W.2d 504, 506 (Minn. 1986) (stating that “administrative agencies may adopt 
regulations to implement or make specific the language of a statute” as long as they do not 
“adopt a conflicting rule”); Carlson, 747 N.W.2d at 372 (stating that courts may “accord 
substantial consideration” to the interpretations by the agencies). 
141 Heilman v. Courtney, 926 N.W.2d 387, 397–98 (Minn. 2019).  
142 Id. at 394–98. 
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intention of the legislature.”143 This must be the chief purpose even during 
the first step of statutory interpretation, which requires determining if a 
statute’s language is ambiguous.144  
As outlined in Justice Lillehaug’s dissent, there are two reasonable 
interpretations of the phrase “release from prison” as found in the felony 
DWI statute.145 The first defines “release from prison” as the point at which 
a person is no longer housed within the walls of a Minnesota correctional 
institution.146 The second reasonable interpretation of “released from 
prison” is the point at which people complete their mandated “term of 
imprisonment.”147  
In Minnesota, the phrase “term of imprisonment” is defined by 
statute and refers to two-thirds of a person’s executed prison sentence.148 
People are mandated to spend this time in custody if they are sentenced on 
a felony-level offense.149 This interpretation is reasonable, as courts can 
assume that the legislature enacts statutes with knowledge of prior 
legislation.150 Thus, when the legislature passed the felony DWI statute, it 
did so with the knowledge that all people convicted of felony DWIs are 
mandated to serve two-thirds of their executed sentence in prison.151 This 
knowledge should inform the interpretation of “release from prison” as it 
was known to the legislature. Additionally, sections 169A.276 and 244.101, 
subdivision 1, of the Minnesota Statutes can be reviewed in tandem to 
determine if an ambiguity exists.152  
Based on these premises, the phrase “release from prison” could 
reasonably refer to either (1) when a person is no longer confined to a 
Minnesota correctional institution, or (2) the point at which a person has 
completed the mandated term of imprisonment. Because these two 
conflicting but reasonable interpretations exist, the phrase “release from 
prison” in the felony DWI statute is inescapably subject to two meanings, 
rendering the statute ambiguous.153  
Furthermore, the overall result of Heilman’s statutory 
                                                           
143 MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2019). 
144 See id.; SINGER & SINGER, supra note 116. 
145 Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 401. 
146 Id.  
147 Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subdiv. 1 (2019). 
148 MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subdiv. 1. 
149 Id. 
150 See State v. Leathers, 799 N.W.2d 606, 609 (Minn. 2011) (quoting Meister v. W. Nat’l 
Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 372, 378 (Minn. 1992)). 
151 See MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subdiv. 1. 
152 See Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 532 (Minn. 2013); Martin v. Dicklich, 823 
N.W.2d 336 (Minn. 2012). 
153 See State v. Jones, 848 N.W.2d 528, 535 (Minn. 2014) (citing State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 
303, 307 (Minn. 2012)).  
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interpretation is absurd.  The Heilman interpretation, as applied to 
Heilman’s circumstances, means that while Heilman was serving the 
remainder of his prison term after failing out of Bootcamp, he was earning 
time credited towards his conditional release term.154 The court determined, 
in Duncan v. Roy, that time spent incarcerated for a supervised release 
violation cannot count towards a person’s conditional release term because 
conditional release is meant to be served in the community.155 Thus, the 
Heilman decision creates an irrational result where a person is receiving 
credit towards a conditional release term while incarcerated and not in the 
community, as is required for conditional release.156 
Due to the statute’s inescapable ambiguity, the court should have 
conducted a comprehensive statutory interpretation analysis, considering 
factors such as other laws on the same subject, the purpose of the law, the 
consequences of a particular interpretation, and administrative and 
legislative interpretations of the statute.157 The court also should have 
reviewed previous interpretations of the relevant statutes and any relevant 
administrative interpretations provided by the Department of Corrections, 
the party responsible for calculating the start date of conditional release.158 
Outlined next is the statutory analysis the court should have completed in 
Heilman.  
b. Determining and Effectuating the Legislative Intent Behind the 
Phrase “Release from Prison” Through an Examination of 
Other Relevant Statutes and Legislation  
To effectuate the intent of the legislature through statutory 
interpretation, the court should have considered other laws on the same 
subject, the purpose of the law, the consequences of a particular 
                                                           
154 Heilman v. Courtney, 926 N.W.2d 387, 394–97 (Minn. 2019).  
155 State ex. rel. Duncan v. Roy, 887 N.W.2d 271, 278–79 n.8 (Minn. 2016).   
156 See id. While the court declined to directly address whether a person may receive credit 
for time spent incarcerated during a supervised-release term, its holding, coupled with the 
newly adopted definition of “released from prison,” essentially requires people to serve their 
conditional release period in the community. Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 645.17(1) (2019) 
(instructing courts to presume that the legislature does not intend for absurd results when 
passing legislation).  
157 See MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2019).  
158 See Frieler v. Carlson Mktg. Grp., 751 N.W.2d 558, 567 (Minn. 2008) (applying the 
Department of Human Rights’ interpretation of a statutory amendment as support for the 
interpretation of the statute under Minnesota law); Green v. Whirlpool Corp., 389 N.W.2d 
504, 506 (Minn. 1986) (stating that “administrative agencies may adopt regulations to 
implement or make specific the language of a statute” as long as they do not “adopt a 
conflicting rule”); Carlson v. Dep’t of Emp’t and Econ. Dev., 747 N.W.2d 367, 372 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2008) (indicating courts can give “substantial consideration to administrative 
interpretations by the responsible agency” when attempting to ascertain the meaning behind 
statutory language).  
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interpretation, and administrative and legislative interpretations of the 
statute.159 The relevant statutes to consider here include: the felony DWI 
statute mandating a five-year conditional release term for all people 
convicted of a felony DWI;160 the statute providing guidelines for any felony-
level sentence;161 the series of statutes governing Bootcamp;162 the statute 
governing Work Release;163 and the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.164  
Like the statutes interpreted in State v. Leathers, Chapters 169 and 
244 of the Minnesota Statutes are related and should be interpreted 
together.165 Chapter 244 governs sentencing for all felony-level offenses, 
including the offenses enumerated in Chapter 169 of the Minnesota 
Statutes.166 The phrase “release from prison” in the felony DWI statute 
should be construed in conjunction with section 244.01 because they are in 
pari materia.  
Chapter 244.101 explains that a felony sentence must “consist[] of 
two parts: (1) a specified minimum term of imprisonment that is equal to 
two-thirds of the executed sentence; and (2) a specified maximum 
supervised release term that is equal to one-third of the executed 
sentence.”167 Thus, it is logical for the phrase “release from prison” to refer 
to a person’s release from confinement after completion of the mandated 
minimum term of imprisonment.168 This interpretation is supported by 
Huseby v. Roy, where the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that departing 
prison for Work Release is not a “release from prison” because construing 
the departure as a release would allow people to be “release[d] from prison” 
before completing the required minimum term of imprisonment.169  
As previously stated, in Minnesota, a fixed executed sentence for a 
felony-level offense requires “a specified maximum supervised release term 
                                                           
159 See MINN. STAT. § 645.16.  
160 MINN. STAT. § 169A.276, subdiv. 1(d) (2019). 
161 See MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subdiv. 1 (2019).  
162 MINN. STAT. §§ 244.17–.173 (2019). 
163 MINN. STAT. § 241.26 (2019). 
164 MINN. STAT. § 244.09, subdiv. 5(2) (2019) (providing the purpose behind the sentencing 
guidelines). 
165 See State v. Leathers, 799 N.W.2d 606, 609 (Minn. 2011) (explaining that chapters 244 
and 609 of the Minnesota statutes are interrelated and should be interpreted in light of each 
other). 
166 See id. Chapter 169 provides more detailed direction on sentencing people convicted of 
felony DWIs. MINN. STAT. § 169A.276 (2019). 
167 MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subdiv. 1 (2019). 
168 Id.; MINN. STAT. § 169A.276 (applying the phrase “release[d] from prison” to people 
convicted of felony DWI). 
169 State ex rel. Huseby v. Roy, 903 N.W.2d 633, 637, 639 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (citing 
MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subdiv. 1 (2017)) (requiring a minimum of two-thirds of a person’s 
executed sentence to be served in prison).  
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that is equal to one-third of the executed sentence.”170 The statutory language 
makes it clear that a person cannot serve more than one-third of an executed 
sentence in the community on supervised release.171  
 The court’s decision in Heilman allows conditional release terms 
for some people to begin early because conditional release can start before 
the completion of the minimum term of imprisonment.172 This decision 
defies legislative intent because it leads to an absurd result by allowing a 
portion of the Minnesota Statute to become ineffective and uncertain.173 It 
renders section 244.101, subdivision 1(d), of the Minnesota Statutes 
ineffective and its application uncertain because Bootcamp participants 
convicted of felony DWI need not serve the mandated minimum term of 
imprisonment—they can be “release[d] from prison” before serving two-
thirds of their executed sentence. This creates an absurd circumstance in 
which section 244.101 of the Minnesota Statutes no longer applies to a 
group of people convicted of felonies, specifically those convicted of felony 
DWI and participating in Bootcamp. 
 Additionally, the Heilman decision disregards the legislative intent 
in providing sentencing guidelines and mandating conditional release for 
certain offenses.174 The purpose of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines “is 
to establish rational and consistent sentencing standards that promote public 
safety, reduce sentencing disparities, and ensure that the sanctions imposed 
for felony convictions are proportional to the severity of the convicted 
offense and the offender's criminal history.”175 Thus, the legislature intends 
criminal sentences to be promulgated in a consistent and fair manner.176  
Furthermore, to encourage successful reentry into society, 
conditional release statutes are meant to provide people with close 
supervision by the Commissioner of Corrections after being released from 
                                                           
170 MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subdiv. 1. 
171 Id.  
172 Heilman v. Courtney, 926 N.W.2d 387, 396–97 (Minn. 2019); see also MINN. STAT. 
§ 169A.276, subdiv. 1(d) (indicating that conditional release begins after a person convicted 
of felony DWI is released from prison); MINN. STAT. § 244.05, subdiv. 1b (2019) (requiring 
two-thirds of an executed felony sentence to be served in prison); State ex rel. Pollard v. Roy, 
878 N.W.2d 341, 345 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016) (explaining that allowing an a person to receive 
credit towards a supervised release term while in custody would be absurd). 
173 See MINN. STAT. § 645.17(1)–(2) (2019) (stating the legislature does not intend for an 
absurd result in passing legislation and that the legislature intends all parts of a statute to be 
effective and certain). 
174 See MINN. STAT. § 244.09, subdiv. 5 (2019); State ex rel. Ward v. Roy, No. A15–1475, 
2016 WL 3375989, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. June 20, 2016) (providing information on the 
general intent behind conditional release statutes); Miller v. State, 714 N.W.2d 745, 748 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (explaining the general intent behind conditional release statutes). 
175 About MSGC, MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, https://mn.gov/sentencing-
guidelines/about/ [https://perma.cc/WMJ6-G3B3]. 
176 Id.  
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prison.177 Conditional release statutes accomplish this by mandating 
supervision in the community for a fixed period that is not subject to 
fluctuation on a person-to-person basis.178 The felony DWI statute 
specifically provides for a five-year conditional release term to be applied to 
all people convicted of felony DWI.179 This sanction should be applied to 
all people convicted of felony DWIs in a fair and consistent manner 
pursuant to the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.180  
Contrary to these legislative purposes, the court’s decision in 
Heilman allows some people convicted of felony DWI to begin their 
conditional release terms early by allowing conditional release to begin when 
a person departs for Phase II of Bootcamp.181 Instead of preventing 
disparities in sentencing, the court in Heilman created disparities by 
allowing Bootcamp participants convicted of felony DWIs to be treated 
differently than all other people convicted of that same offense.182  
This judicially created disparity is evident when sentencing 
circumstances and Bootcamp requirements are considered for people 
convicted of felony DWI. Bootcamp participants must have a minimum of 
thirteen months remaining in their term of imprisonment to be eligible for 
Bootcamp.183 Participants spend six months in Phase I of Bootcamp before 
they are eligible to depart for Phase II, which triggers the start of their 
conditional release according to the Heilman court.184 This means that 
Bootcamp participants convicted of felony DWI can begin their conditional 
release term seven months before their counterparts who are not involved 
in Bootcamp.185  
However, the maximum sentence for a first-degree DWI is a total 
of seven years, making the minimum term of imprisonment fifty-six 
months.186 Thus, it is plausible that someone sentenced to the statutory 
                                                           
177 Miller, 714 N.W.2d at 748 (specifically referencing the conditional release statute in 
section 609.109, subdivision 7(b), of the 1998 Minnesota Statutes to provide that concepts 
regarding the statute’s intent apply to conditional release generally). 
178 See MINN. STAT. § 169A.276, subdiv. 1(d) (2019); State v. Ward, 847 N.W.2d 29, 34 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that the legislature intended conditional release to allow for 
supervision of a person recently released from confinement for a fixed period of time after 
he or she returns to the community). 
179 MINN. STAT. § 169A.276, subdiv. 1(d) (emphasis added). 
180 MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 1(A) (MINN. SENTENCING COMM’N 2019) (indicating 
the Sentencing Guidelines are meant to establish rational and consistent sentencing standard 
that reduce disparity). 
181 Heilman v. Courtney, 926 N.W.2d 387, 394 (Minn. 2019).  
182 See id.; MINN. STAT. § 244.09, subdiv. 5 (2019). 
183 Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 404 (attaching Policies, Directives and Instructions Manual, 
MINN. DEP’T OF CORR. div. directive 204.060 (Nov. 7, 2017)) 
184 Id. at 394, 404. 
185 Id. 
186 MINN. STAT. §§ 169A.24, subdiv. 2, 244.05, subdiv. 1b (2019). 
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maximum for first-degree felony DWI could begin Bootcamp immediately 
after arriving in prison and could be eligible for Phase II with fifty months—
over four years—remaining in his or her sentence.187 This effectively begins 
the mandated conditional release term fifty months earlier than people 
convicted of felony DWI who do not participate in Bootcamp.188  
This result frustrates the legislative purpose of encouraging 
successful reentry into society through close supervision of people convicted 
of felony DWIs.189 By the time felony DWI Bootcamp participants 
complete their minimum term of imprisonment, they will have already 
completed fifty months of their mandated conditional release term, which 
is only sixty months long.190  
The disparity the court created is even more apparent given that 
people convicted of felony DWI who participate in Work Release are not 
“release[d] from prison” under the felony DWI statute, despite the 
similarities between Work Release and Bootcamp.191 Clearly, this is not the 
legislature’s intent as it creates significant disparities in the application of 
criminal sentences, which directly contradicts the stated purpose of the 
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.192  
Furthermore, the Heilman decision does not fulfill the purpose of 
conditional release statutes because it creates a circumstance where a person 
no longer has an extended term of community supervision after completing 
an executed sentence.193 Given the relevant laws, purposes of those laws, and 
                                                           
187 See MINN. STAT. § 169A.276, subdiv. 1(d) (2019). 
188 See id. 
189 See Miller v. State, 714 N.W.2d 745, 748 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (explaining that 
conditional release functions as an additional term of supervision allowing former prisoners 
to be under close supervision to promote successful reentry). 
190 See MINN. STAT. § 169A.276, subdiv. 1(d) (2019).  
191  See State ex rel. Huseby v. Roy, 903 N.W.2d 633, 637 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (“The 
DOC’s interpretation of work release as not constituting a ‘release from prison,’ so as to 
trigger the start of the five-year conditional release term under section 169A.276, subdivision 
1(d), maintains consistency and continuity between these related release statutes.”); State ex 
rel. Weyaus v. Roy, No. A17-1082, 2017 WL 4478229, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2017) 
(reiterating that persons convicted of felony DWI are not “released from prison” so as to 
trigger the commencement of their mandated conditional release when they depart from 
prison to participate in Work Release). The Heilman court also noted that its decision did 
not apply to Work Release participants. Heilman v. Courtney, 926 N.W.2d 387, 396 (Minn. 
2019). 
192 See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 1(A) (MINN. SENTENCING COMM’N 2019) 
(indicating the Sentencing Guidelines are meant to establish rational and consistent 
sentencing standard that reduce disparity). 
193 See Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 394 (Minn. 2019) (allowing conditional release to commence 
when a person departs for Phase II of the Challenge Incarceration Program). But see State 
v. Ward, 847 N.W.2d 29, 34 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014) (suggesting people should not receive 
credit towards their conditional release time for time spent in custody because it would 
render the statutes absurd).  
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the consequences of the Heilman decision, it is apparent the court did not 
act according to legislative intent.194 
  
                                                           
194 See Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 394 (allowing people to begin conditional release when they 
begin Phase II of the Challenge Incarceration Program despite not having completed the 
mandatory two-thirds incarceration term). 
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c. Determining and Effectuating the Legislative Intent Behind the 
Phrase “Release from Prison” in the Felony DWI Statute 
Through an Examination of Prior Interpretations of Relevant 
Statutes and Ambiguous Terms 
If a court has previously interpreted a statute, that interpretation can 
guide courts in future interpretations of the same statute or language.195 
While the Minnesota Supreme Court has not interpreted “release from 
prison,” as used in section 169A.276 of the Minnesota Statutes, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals has interpreted this phrase and other relevant 
statutes.196 These court of appeals’ cases provide insight on how to carry out 
the statutory interpretation at issue in Heilman.  
In Huseby v. Roy, the defendant, Huseby, was incarcerated after a 
felony DWI conviction under section 169A.276 of the Minnesota 
Statutes.197 Huseby opted to participate in Work Release while 
incarcerated.198 He argued that when he left the prison to participate in 
Work Release, he was “release[d] from prison,” which triggered the start of 
his mandated five-year conditional release term.199 Conversely, the 
Department of Corrections argued that “Work Release is an extension of 
confinement, not a release from confinement.”200  
The Huseby court indicated that people “must serve a minimum 
term of imprisonment equal to two-thirds of their sentence before they are 
eligible for supervised release.”201 Furthermore, the court determined that 
because the Department of Corrections is authorized to allow incarcerated 
people to participate in Work Release after completing only half of their 
term of imprisonment, incarcerated people “may be eligible to participate 
in Work Release while still serving some portion of the term of 
imprisonment.”202 Thus, conditional release could not be triggered by 
departure for Work Release.203 
The Huseby court considered the language in the Work Release 
                                                           
195 Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 538 (Minn. 2013). 
196 See State ex rel. Huseby v. Roy, 903 N.W.2d 633, 638 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (explaining 
that a person convicted of felony DWI is not “released from prison” for the purposes of 
triggering the commencement of conditional release when they depart from prison to 
participate in Work Release); Carlson v. Dep’t of Emp’t and Econ. Dev., 747 N.W.2d 367, 
372 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (explaining that an individual on electric home monitoring is still 
considered incarcerated and not released under Minnesota Statute section 169A.276, 
meaning they are unable to collect unemployment while on electric home monitoring). 
197 Huseby, 903 N.W.2d at 634. 
198 Id.  
199 Id. at 636.  
200 Id.  
201 Id. 
202 Id. at 637.  
203 See id. 
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statute to support its interpretation of Work Release to be an extension of 
incarceration.204 For example, the statutory language indicates that the 
Commissioner of Corrections must approve a person’s proposed residence 
while on Work Release.205 Additionally, the Work Release statutes refer to 
participants as inmates.206 Participants are treated like inmates insofar as a 
failure to return from planned employment while on Work Release could 
result in a charge for an escape from confinement.207 Thus, if Work Release 
participants were “released from prison,” the language indicating that Work 
Release is an extension of confinement, that participants are still considered 
inmates, and that participants can be charged with escape, would all have no 
meaning or effect—thereby rendering it “superfluous, void or 
insignificant.”208  
Moreover, if departing for Work Release constitutes a “release 
from prison,” incarcerated people would not be able to serve the mandatory 
minimum term of imprisonment because they would be released from 
prison prior to completing two-thirds of their original, executed sentence.209 
For those reasons, the Huseby court adopted the Department of 
Corrections’ interpretation that Work Release does not constitute a “release 
from prison” triggering the start of a person’s mandated conditional 
release.210  
The court additionally stated: 
[T]he DOC’s interpretation recognizes that while some work 
release programs have no bars or restraints, an inmate is still 
confined and does not enjoy the same level of freedom as that 
experienced on supervised release. Appellant was confined to 
Bethel when not performing approved work, seeking work, or 
participating in educational/vocational activities; he was allowed 
to leave the confinement only if granted a furlough; and his 
options for work release and confinement are designated by the 
commissioner. He was further subject to disciplinary regulations 
that govern the conduct of incarcerated inmates and he was 
prohibited from engaging in escape behavior.211  
                                                           
204 Id.  
205 Id.  
206 Id.  
207 Id.  
208 Id. (citing Rushton v. State, 889 N.W.2d 561, 564 (2017)).  
209 Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subdiv. 1(2017)).  
210 Id. (explaining that the court’s decision and interpretation maintains consistency and 
continuity between the related statutes); see also State ex rel. Weyaus v. Roy, No. A17-1082, 
2017 WL 4478229, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2017) (reiterating that people convicted of 
felony DWI are not “released from prison” when they depart from prison to participate in 
Work Release).   
211 Huseby, 903 N.W.2d at 637–38 (internal citations omitted). 
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 The criteria the court used in Huseby to determine a person is not 
“release[d] from prison” when departing for Work Release is also 
applicable to Bootcamp.212 Like Work Release, people who reside at home 
while in Phase II of Bootcamp do not enjoy the same level of freedom that 
non-incarcerated people on supervised release enjoy.213 Bootcamp 
participants, like Work Release participants, are subject to intense 
supervision during Phase II, including regular drug testing, daily reporting 
to the supervising agent, forced access to their home by a supervising agent, 
and any other conditions imposed by the Commissioner of Corrections.214 
Both Bootcamp and Work Release participants must obtain permission 
from a supervising agent for all activities outside the home215 and cannot 
receive visitors without the permission of a supervising agent.216 Additionally, 
if Bootcamp participants fail to uphold their assigned obligations while 
residing at home during Phase II, they can be sent back to prison or 
terminated from Bootcamp as a sanction, in the same manner Work 
Release participants can be violated.217  
The operational similarities between Bootcamp and Work Release 
necessitate an identical interpretation of the phrase “release from prison.”218 
The need for continuity and consistency within statutes applies just as fully 
to Bootcamp and the felony DWI statute as it does to Work Release and 
the felony DWI statute because the same concerns about people being 
released before completion of the mandated minimum term of 
imprisonment apply.219  
Additionally, in Carlson v. Department of Employment and 
Economic Development, the Minnesota Court of Appeals defined 
                                                           
212 See id.; see also MINN. STAT. §§ 244.17–.173 (2019); Heilman v. Courtney, 926 N.W.2d 
387, 404–13 (defining and instructing the actual promulgation of the Challenge Incarceration 
Program by providing directive for Department of Corrections Employees and providing 
more specific guidelines for Phases II and III of the Challenge Incarceration Program). 
213 MINN. STAT. § 244.172, subdiv. 2 (indicating Phase II of the Challenge Incarceration 
Program is intensive supervised release imposing significant requirements on participants). 
214 Id.; see also Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 412–13 (attaching Policies, Directives and 
Instructions Manual, MINN. DEP’T CORR. div. directive 204.061 (July 26, 2016)). 
215 Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 412. 
216 Id.  
217 Id.  
218 See State ex rel. Huseby v. Roy, 903 N.W.2d 633, 637 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (concluding 
Work Release does not constitute a release from prison that triggers conditional release); see 
also MINN. STAT. § 244.101 (2019) (mandating people convicted of a crime to serve a 
minimum of two-thirds of an executed prison sentence in custody); MINN. STAT. § 169A.276 
(2019) (imposing a mandatory five-year conditional release term on all felony DWI 
convictions).  
219 See Huseby, 903 N.W.2d at 638 (explaining people on Work Release are not released 
under the felony DWI statute because of all the restrictions that apply while on Work 
Release).  
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“incarceration” as “[t]he act or process of confining someone” and 
“confinement” is “the state of being imprisoned or restrained.”220 
Incarceration is dependent on restraint and confinement rather than the 
nature of the location where the restraint and confinement occur.221 “House 
arrest” is defined as “confinement of a person . . . to his or her home.”222 
Thus, the court concluded that individuals on house arrest are still 
considered incarcerated despite residing outside of a correctional 
institution.223  
As Bootcamp participants in Phase II can be on house arrest 
through electronic monitoring, they are considered confined and restrained 
and, therefore, incarcerated.224 If a person is incarcerated, he or she has not 
yet been “released from prison.”225 The court, in Heilman v. Courtney, 
neglected to consider pertinent decisions already made by different courts, 
even though doing so is encouraged in statutory interpretation.226 
d. Determining and Effectuating the Legislative Intent Behind the 
Phrase “Release from Prison” in the Felony DWI Statute 
Through an Examination of Department of Corrections 
Policies and Directives 
“[A]n agency’s interpretation of the statutes it administers is entitled 
to deference and should be upheld, absent a finding that it is in conflict with 
the express purpose of the Act and the intention of the legislature.”227 The 
Department of Corrections’ policies on Bootcamp make clear that 
Bootcamp participants are incarcerated.228 First, participants must have a 
                                                           
220 Carlson v. Dep’t of Emp’t and Econ. Dev., 747 N.W.2d 367, 372 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) 
(quoting Incarceration, Confinement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004)). 
221 Carlson, 747 N.W.2d at 372. 
222 Id. (quoting House Arrest, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004)). 
223 Id. at 374.  
224 See id.; Heilman v. Courtney, 926 N.W.2d 387, 412–13 (attaching Policies, Directives and 
Instructions Manual, MINN. DEP’T CORR. div. directive 204.061 (July 26, 2016)). 
225 See MINN. STAT. § 169A.276 (2019) (containing the phrase “release[ed] from prison”); 
Incarceration, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
226 See Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 394 (Minn. 2019) (providing that conditional release 
commences when a person departs prison for Phase II of the Challenge Incarceration 
Program). But see Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 538 (Minn. 2013) (indicating 
prior interpretations of a statute should guide the court in future interpretations); State ex rel. 
Huseby v. Roy, 903 N.W.2d 633, 637 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (concluding that a departure 
for Work Release does not constitute a release from prison because doing so would eliminate 
consistency and continuity between various release statutes); Carlson, 747 N.W.2d at 372 
(determining a person is incarcerated while subject to electric home monitoring).  
227 Frieler v. Carlson Mktg. Grp., 751 N.W.2d 558, 567 (Minn. 2008) (quoting Geo. A. 
Hormel & Co. v. Asper, 428 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1988)). 
228 Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 404 (attaching Policies, Directives and Instructions Manual, 
MINN. DEP’T CORR. div. directive 204.060 (Nov. 7, 2017)).  
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minimum of thirteen months left in their term of imprisonment to be 
eligible for Bootcamp, indicating that participants are still incarcerated.229 
Next, the Department’s policies have a provision explaining that a 
participant can apply for early release to supervised release after completion 
of Phase III of Bootcamp, implying that a participant is not released before 
completing Phase III.230 Moreover, the criteria for early release is strict—it 
requires that the applicant has not had any violations in Phase II or Phase 
III of Bootcamp.231 These policies indicate that the Department of 
Corrections does not consider participants to be “released from prison” 
while completing Phases II and III of Bootcamp. As such, the court’s 
decision in Heilman is contrary to Department policy, which was created to 
effectuate legislative intent.232 
The Department of Corrections promulgated a new policy in July 
2019.233 This new policy mandates Bootcamp participants to complete their 
minimum terms of imprisonment to be eligible to move to Phase II, which 
allows them to serve the remainder of their sentence in the community.234 
This change effectively counteracts the court’s decision in Heilman because 
it prevents the trigger of conditional release before a person has completed, 
at a minimum, two-thirds of his or her mandated term of imprisonment.235 
Such a contradiction indicates the Department’s belief is that Bootcamp 
should not be considered a “release from prison.” 
Despite the apparent ambiguity of the phrase “release from prison” 
in the felony DWI statute, the Heilman court interpreted the phrase 
according to the proclaimed plain meaning attached by the court.236 The 
culmination of statutes, cases, and documents above indicate that if the court 
had engaged in the necessary statutory interpretation, it would have arrived 
at a different conclusion. Namely, the court would have found that when a 
person departs for Phase II of Bootcamp, it is not a “release from prison” 
within the meaning of the felony DWI Statute. 
                                                           
229 Id.  
230 Id. at 412 (attaching Policies, Directives and Instructions Manual, MINN. DEP’T OF CORR. 
div. directive 204.061 (July 26, 2016)). 
231 Id.  
232 See id. (indicating people are “released from prison” under the felony DWI statute when 
they depart for Phase II of the Challenge Incarceration Program); see also MINN. STAT. 
§ 645.16 (2019) (directing courts to conduct statutory interpretation with the purpose of 
effectuating legislative intent). 
233 Policies, Directives and Instructions Manual, MINN. DEP’T OF CORR. div. directive 204.060 
(July 1, 2019), http://www.doc.state.mn.us/DocPolicy2/html/DPW_Display_TOC.asp?
Opt=204.060.htm [https://perma.cc/FE39-S2VF]. 
234 Id. 
235 Id.  
236 Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 394. 
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B. An Equal Protection Danger Posed by the Court’s Incomplete 
Statutory Interpretation Analysis in Heilman 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides that no state can “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”237 The Minnesota Constitution’s equal 
protection clause similarly provides, “No member of this State shall be 
disfranchised or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any 
citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers.”238 
Both clauses are generally analyzed under the same principles, beginning 
with the mandate that all similarly situated people must be treated alike.239 
Only “invidious discrimination” is deemed constitutionally offensive.240 
“The ground for a constitutional claim, if any, must be found in statutes or 
other rules defining the obligations of the authority charged.”241 
Furthermore, under both constitutions, equal protection claims not 
involving a suspect class or a fundamental right are reviewed under a rational 
basis standard.242  
The federal rational basis standard only requires that the challenged 
legislation “bears a rational relation to a legitimate state purpose.”243 The 
Minnesota Supreme Court, however, has established “‘a more stringent 
standard of review’ than its federal counterpart.”244 Unlike federal courts, 
Minnesota courts are unwilling to hypothesize a possible rational basis to 
justify a classification.245 Instead, Minnesota requires a reasonable 
connection between the actual effect of the challenged classification and the 
statutory goals.246  
                                                           
237 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
238 MINN. CONST., art. I, § 2. 
239 See State v. Cox, 798 N.W.2d 517, 521 (Minn. 2011); State v. Behl, 564 N.W.2d 560, 568 
(Minn. 1997). 
240 In re Estate of Turner, 391 N.W.2d 767, 769 (Minn. 1986) (quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa, 
372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963)). 
241 Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 465 (1981).  
242 See Scott v. Minneapolis Police Relief Ass’n, Inc., 615 N.W.2d 66, 74 (Minn. 2000) (citing 
Turner, 391 N.W.2d at 769). 
243 W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 668 (1981). 
244 In re Durand, 859 N.W.2d 780, 784 (Minn. 2015) (quoting State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 
886, 889 (Minn. 1991)). 
245 Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 889. 
246 Id. This independent and stricter rational basis review is warranted and necessary for 
Minnesota to guarantee equal protection under the Minnesota Constitution, despite the 
continually changing federal case law surrounding federal equal protection rights. Id. The 
court explained:  
To harness interpretation of our state constitutional guarantees of equal 
protection to federal standards and shift the meaning of Minnesota’s 
constitution every time federal case law changes would undermine the 
integrity and independence of our state constitution and degrade the 
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1. Minnesota’s Equal Protection Standard and Rational Basis Test 
To prevail on an equal protection challenge, as a threshold 
requirement, the individual challenging the classification has the burden to 
show the two classes created by the state action are similarly situated in 
relevant respects.247 This is because “the Equal Protection Clause does not 
require that the State treat persons who are differently situated as though 
they were the same.”248  
If neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right is implicated by 
the state action, Minnesota courts will apply the Minnesota rational basis 
test.249 Minnesota’s rational basis test requires that:  
(1) The distinctions which separate those included within the 
classification from those excluded must not be manifestly 
arbitrary or fanciful but must be genuine and substantial, thereby 
providing a natural and reasonable basis to justify legislation 
adapted to peculiar conditions and needs; 
(2) the classification must be genuine or relevant to the purpose 
of the law; that is there must be an evident connection between 
the distinctive needs peculiar to the class and the prescribed 
remedy; and 
(3) the purpose of the statute must be one that the state can 
legitimately attempt to achieve.250 
 Above all, the ultimate purpose of the Minnesota rational basis test 
is to ensure a reasonable connection exists between the actual effect of the 
challenged classification and the actual statutory goals involved.251 Minnesota 
case law illuminates the application of this rule. The first prong of the test—
a genuine and substantial distinction between those inside and outside the 
class—requires the state to show more than anecdotal support for the 
                                                           
special role of this court, as the highest court of a sovereign state, to 
respond to the needs of Minnesota citizens. 
Id. 
247 State v. Johnson, 813 N.W.2d 1, 12 (Minn. 2012). 
248 Id. (citing Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992)). 
249 See Scott v. Minneapolis Police Relief Ass’n, Inc., 615 N.W.2d 66, 74 (Minn. 2000) (citing 
In re Estate of Turner, 391 N.W.2d 767, 769 (Minn. 1986)). A fundamental right is one that 
is “objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997). Fundamental rights are “‘implicit in the concept 
of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’” 
Id. at 721 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–26 (1937)). Suspect 
classifications are defined as “classification[s] based on race, national origin, [or] alienage.” 
Suspect Classification, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also Graham v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971) (classifications based on citizenship and alien 
status are inherently suspect); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (racial 
classifications are constitutionally suspect). 
250 Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 888. 
251 Id. at 889.  
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classification.252 Rather, some sort of evidence or scientific study should be 
provided to justify the classification.253 The rationale for a classification 
cannot be based purely on assumption.254  
The second prong requires a showing that the created classification 
is relevant to its asserted purpose.255 To ascertain if the classification is 
relevant, the court can review the statutory objective of the statute and 
surrounding statutes.256 Under the third rational basis prong, “[a]n interest is 
generally considered legitimate if it advances one of the state’s traditional 
police powers.”257  
Lastly, there is an additional consideration for criminal statutes. A 
criminal statute is unconstitutional under the Minnesota Equal Protection 
Clause if it prescribes different punishments or different degrees of 
punishment for the same conduct committed under similar circumstances 
by people who are similarly situated.258 Thus, in order to establish that equal 
protection has been denied, an individual must show that similarly situated 
people have been punished differently.259 
2. Applying Minnesota’s Rational Basis Test to the Classifications 
Created by the Heilman Decision 
To demonstrate the potential equal protection violation created by 
the court’s decision in Heilman v. Courtney, this section analyzes the 
classifications under the Minnesota rational basis standard. The threshold 
requirement for equal protection claims is a showing that the two classes 
created by the court’s decision are similarly situated in relevant respects.260 
When criminal punishments are at issue, classes are similarly situated if the 
criminalized conduct perpetrated by people in both classes is the same.261 
The critical inquiry is whether the elements of the conduct punished in each 
                                                           
252 See Weir v. ACCRA Care, Inc., 828 N.W.2d 470, 474 (Minn. 2013). 
253 See ACCRA Care, 828 N.W.2d at 474 (“[A] classification failed the first step of the 
Minnesota rational-basis test because the classification was not based on studies or 
evidence.”); Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 889–90 (requiring more than anecdotal evidence for a 
genuine and substantial distinction between classifications). 
254 ACCRA Care, 828 N.W.2d at 474 (citing Healthstar Home Health, Inc. v. Jesson, 827 
N.W.2d 444, 451 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012)). 
255 See Mitchell v. Steffen, 487 N.W.2d 896, 904 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). 
256 See id. at 904–05. 
257 Kelly A. Spencer, Sex Offenders and the City: Ban Orders, Freedom of Movement, and 
Doe v. City of Lafayette, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 297, 306 (2002). 
258 State v. Barnes, 713 N.W.2d 325, 331–32 (Minn. 2006). 
259 See Paquin v. Mack, 788 N.W.2d 899, 906 (Minn. 2010). 
260 State v. Johnson, 813 N.W.2d 1, 12 (Minn. 2012).  
261 See State v. Cox, 798 N.W.2d 517, 522 (Minn. 2011) (indicating equal protection is not 
denied by a statute assigning different punishment to a convicted person unless it gives 
different punishments for the same crime committed under the same circumstances by 
people in similar situations). 
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classification are the same or essentially similar.262  
Here, the Minnesota rational basis test will apply, as Heilman 
concerned neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental right.263 
Nonetheless, in Heilman, the court created two classifications: Bootcamp 
participants convicted of felony-level DWIs and all other persons convicted 
of felony-level DWIs.264 The criminal conduct punished in each class is not 
just similar, it is identical.265 People in both classifications are charged under 
the felony DWI statute.266 The statute requires all people convicted of felony 
DWI to serve five years of conditional release after leaving prison.267 Even 
though people can have varying prison sentences and can elect to participate 
in incarceration programs, the conditional release term is fixed and applies 
evenly to all persons convicted of felony-level DWI.268 Therefore, the classes 
created by the Heilman decision are similarly situated, and the threshold 
requirement for an equal protection claim is met.  
a. The First Prong of the Rational Basis Test: The Classifications 
Must Be Genuine and Substantial, Not Arbitrary  
The first prong of the rational basis test requires that “[t]he 
distinctions which separate those included within the classification from 
those excluded must not be manifestly arbitrary or fanciful but must be 
genuine and substantial.”269 This means the state must show more than 
anecdotal support for the classification because the state’s rationale for a 
distinction cannot be based purely on assumptions.270 The Heilman decision 
does not satisfy this prong because the court did not consider the potential 
classifications created through its decision. As such, the court provided no 
evidentiary support for its decision outside of its interpretation of the 
statutory language which ignored legislative intent.271 The result is an 
                                                           
262 Cox, 798 N.W.2d at 522 (citing State v. Frazier, 649 N.W.2d 828, 837 (Minn. 2002)). 
263 See supra note 249 and accompanying text.  
264 See Heilman v. Courtney, 926 N.W.2d 387, 394 (Minn. 2019). The Heilman court creates 
this distinction because Bootcamp participants begin their conditional release when they 
depart for Phase II of Bootcamp, while people who do not participate in Bootcamp will not 
begin their conditional release term until the completion of their minimum term of 
imprisonment. Id. at 394.  
265 See MINN. STAT. § 169A.276, subdiv. 1(a), (d) (2019) (mandating a minimum five-year 
conditional release term for people sentenced with a felony DWI).  
266 See id.; Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 394 (determining that people who leave prison as part 
of the Challenge Incarceration Program are released from prison under the felony DWI 
statute).  
267 MINN. STAT. § 169A.276. 
268 Id. 
269 State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 888 (Minn. 1991). 
270 See id. 
271 See Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 394; see also Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 889. 
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arbitrary classification between two groups of people convicted of felony-
level DWI, which does not meet the first prong of the rational basis test.272  
Even if Bootcamp participants could be considered distinct from 
all other people convicted of felony-level DWI because they elect to 
participate in an incarceration program, they are not sufficiently 
distinguishable from Work Release participants. Nevertheless, Work 
Release participants are not afforded the same privilege of beginning 
conditional release early when they depart from the prison to participate in 
Work Release.273 This is problematic because, as explained earlier, 
Bootcamp and Work Release are both optional, community-based 
incarceration programs with similar requirements and operational program 
guidelines.274 This makes the court’s decision irrational and unsupported by 
any substantial differences between Bootcamp and Work Release, 
indicating that the first prong of the rational basis test is not met. 
The critical inquiry in validating class distinctions is whether the 
elements of the conduct punished in each classification are the same or 
essentially similar.275 Mandated conditional release applies to all persons 
sentenced for felony-level DWI after completion of the term of 
imprisonment despite varying lengths in prison sentences.276 Thus, the 
decision a person makes once incarcerated, such as participating in an 
incarceration program, should not have any effect on felony DWI 
conditional release because it should apply identically to all people 
convicted of felony-level DWI.277 Therefore, the court’s decision in 
                                                           
272 See Weir v. ACCRA Care, Inc., 828 N.W.2d 470, 474 (Minn. 2013) (indicating that a 
classification based on anecdotal observations of one expert witness, rather than studies or 
evidence, does not pass the first prong of Minnesota’s rational basis test); Russell, 477 
N.W.2d at 888–90 (holding that a statute failed the first prong of Minnesota’s rational basis 
test because there was a lack of a substantial distinction between those inside and outside of 
the class and the only support provided for the classification was purely anecdotal testimony). 
273 See, e.g., State ex rel. Huseby v. Roy, 903 N.W.2d 633, 637 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) 
(indicating people convicted of felony DWI are not “released from prison” under section 
169A.276 of the Minnesota Statutes when they depart prison for Work Release); State ex 
rel. Weyaus v. Roy, No. A17-1082, 2017 WL 4478229, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2017) 
(reaffirming that when a participant leaves prison to participate in Work Release, they are 
not “released from prison” under Minnesota Statutes section 169A.276). 
274 See discussion supra Section II.B. 
275 See State v. Barnes, 713 N.W.2d 325, 331 (Minn. 2006) (finding that classifications did 
not violate equal protection because the two statutes in question “punish very different 
conduct”); State v. Frazier, 649 N.W.2d 828, 837 (Minn. 2002) (“A statute violates the equal 
protection clause when it prescribes different punishments or different degrees of 
punishment for the same conduct committed under the same circumstances by persons 
similarly situated. Thus, the critical inquiry is whether the elements [the] statute[s] are the 
same or essentially similar.” (internal citations omitted)). 
276 See MINN. STAT. § 169A.276 (2019). 
277 See id. (providing a sentencing structure for all persons convicted of felony-level DWI, 
specifically that all persons must serve a five-year conditional release term if their prison 
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Heilman does not satisfy the first prong of the rational basis test as the 
distinctions created are manifestly arbitrary and unsupported by evidence. 
  
                                                           
sentence is executed); State v. Cox, 798 N.W.2d 517, 522 (Minn. 2011) (explaining that 
statutes can violate equal protection when they punish people differently despite the fact that 
they punish identical conduct). But see Frazier, 649 N.W.2d at 837 (concluding a statute did 
not violate equal protection because the people being punished in each class were not 
similarly situated). 
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b. The Second Prong of the Rational Basis Test: An Evident 
Connection Between the Classification and the Law 
The second prong of the rational basis test requires classifications 
to be “genuine or relevant to the purpose of the law.”278 To ascertain if the 
classification is relevant, the objective of the statute and surrounding statutes 
should be examined.279 The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines indicate that 
the purpose of the guidelines “is to establish rational and consistent 
sentencing standards that promote public safety, reduce sentencing 
disparity, and ensure that the sanctions imposed for felony convictions are 
proportional to the severity of the conviction offense and the offender’s 
criminal history.”280 Additionally, conditional release statutes are created to 
provide people convicted of certain offenses with close supervision for a 
fixed term by the Commissioner of Corrections after release from prison.281 
The court’s decision in Heilman effectively ignores the legislative 
purpose for both the Sentencing Guidelines and the felony DWI 
conditional release statute because it creates both disparity and 
unpredictability in sentencing. Disparity and unpredictability are an 
inescapable result when one class of people can begin conditional release 
earlier than similarly situated others. Bootcamp participants can begin their 
conditional release between seven282 and fifty283 months earlier than all other 
people convicted of felony DWI. Thus, the second prong of the rational 
basis test is not met as the classifications created in Heilman do not have a 
genuine or relevant connection to the purposes behind criminal sentencing 
guidelines or conditional release statutes.284 
  
                                                           
278 Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 888. 
279 See Mitchell v. Steffen, 487 N.W.2d 896, 904–05 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). 
280 MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, supra note 175. 
281 See Miller v. State, 714 N.W.2d 745, 748 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (specifically referencing 
the conditional release statute contained in section 609.109, subdivision 7(b), of the 1998 
Minnesota Statutes; however, the concepts apply to conditional release generally). 
282 The minimum of seven months comes from the requirement that participants have a 
minimum of thirteen months left on their sentence to participate in Bootcamp. This, 
combined with the required six months in Phase I, allows participants to leave for Phase II 
seven months before their release date. See Heilman v. Courtney, 926 N.W.2d 387, 404 
(attaching Policies, Directives and Instructions Manual, MINN. DEP’T OF CORR. div. directive 
204.060 (Nov. 7, 2017)).  
283 The maximum of fifty months is derived from the statutory maximum sentence of seven 
years for first-degree DWI, meaning a person would serve a minimum term of imprisonment 
of fifty-six months. MINN. STAT. §§ 169A.24, subdiv. 2, 244.05, subdiv. 1b (2019). Thus, 
incarcerated people who become involved in Bootcamp immediately could complete Phase 
I and release to Phase II with fifty months remaining in their sentence. See Heilman, 926 
N.W.2d at 404 (attaching Policies, Directives and Instructions Manual, MINN. DEP’T OF 
CORR. div. directive 204.060 (Nov. 7, 2017)).  
284 See State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 888 (Minn. 1991). 
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c. The Third Prong of the Rational Basis Test: A Legitimate State 
Interest 
The third prong of the Minnesota rational basis test requires the 
purpose behind the classification to be related to a legitimate state interest.285 
“An interest is generally considered legitimate if it advances one of the state’s 
traditional police powers.”286 Determining what conduct to criminalize and 
what punishments to attach clearly falls within a state’s traditional police 
powers because it is within the powers of “a sovereign to make all laws 
necessary and proper to preserve the public security, order, health, morality, 
and justice.”287 In this case, the third prong of the rational basis test is likely 
satisfied because the statute involved is a statute punishing criminal conduct, 
through which the state legitimately exercises its traditional police power to 
determine what conduct to criminalize.288 
d. The Overall Purpose of the Rational Basis Test: A Reasonable 
Connection Between the Actual Effect of a Classification and 
the Purpose of the Classification 
 The ultimate purpose of the Minnesota rational basis test is to 
ensure a reasonable connection exists between the actual effect of the 
challenged classification and the statutory goals involved.289 The purpose 
behind the felony DWI statute is to ensure people remain supervised in the 
community for a fixed period after completing their term of imprisonment 
so as to smooth their transition back into society after incarceration.290 The 
legislature also intended criminal sentences to be promulgated in a fair, 
consistent, and equitable manner to reduce disparity.291  
The decision in Heilman creates a circumstance where similarly 
situated people receive disparate sentences because Bootcamp participants 
can begin their conditional release significantly earlier than people who do 
not participate in Bootcamp.292 Bootcamp participants may serve less of their 
                                                           
285 See Weir v. ACCRA Care, Inc., 828 N.W.2d 470, 476 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013). 
286 Spencer, supra note 257. 
287 Police Power, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
288 See ACCRA Care, 828 N.W.2d at 476 (“The third step of Minnesota’s rational-basis test 
is to analyze whether the purpose of the amendment is “one that the state can legitimately 
attempt to achieve.”); Spencer, supra note 257 (indicating a state’s purpose is usually 
legitimate if it relates to the state’s police powers or interests). 
289 Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 889.  
290 See Miller v. State, 714 N.W.2d 745, 748 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (explaining the purposes 
behind conditional release); see also supra notes 177–180 and accompanying text. 
291 See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 1(A) (MINN. SENTENCING COMM’N 2019) 
(indicating the Sentencing Guidelines are meant to establish rational and consistent 
sentencing standard that reduce disparity). 
292 See id. (indicating the intent that there be rational and consistent sentencing standards 
which promote public safety while reducing sentencing disparities); Heilman v. Courtney, 
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conditional release term in the community than other people convicted of 
felony DWI because some of their conditional release time is expended 
during their time participating in Phases II and III of Bootcamp.293 As such, 
the court’s decision in Heilman undercuts the legitimate state and legislative 
purposes for conditional release and criminal sentencing guidelines, 
creating a circumstance where the state’s purposes are not achieved. The 
classifications created by the court’s decision in Heilman are not reasonably 
related to the purpose of the statutes and, therefore, fail to satisfy the rational 
basis test.294  
In short, the classifications created by the Heilman decision would not 
satisfy the requirements of the Minnesota rational basis test because the 
classifications drawn in Heilman were arbitrary and did not genuinely or 
appropriately relate to the legitimate legislative purpose behind the felony DWI 
conditional release statute or the Sentencing Guidelines.295 Overall, the Minnesota 
rational basis test is not satisfied because the classifications do not reasonably relate 
to the actual legislative intent behind the felony DWI statute and the Sentencing 
Guidelines.296  
V. CONCLUSION 
The Heilman court interpreted “released from prison” in a manner 
inconsistent with legislative intent, case history, and administrative guidelines. Had 
the court undertaken a comprehensive statutory interpretation, it would have 
determined that the phrase “release from prison” is ambiguous and refers to a 
person’s release from a term of imprisonment. Thus, participants’ departure for 
Phase II of Bootcamp cannot constitute a “release from prison” unless they have 
completed their mandated minimum term of imprisonment. Furthermore, the 
Heilman decision violates equal protection by allowing people who are similarly 
situated to be treated differently without a rational basis for such disparate 
treatment. 
                                                           
926 N.W.2d 387, 394 (Minn. 2019) (holding that persons convicted of felony DWI who 
depart from prison for Phase II of the Challenge Incarceration Program are “released from 
prison” for the purpose of triggering their conditional release, and noting that this decision 
does not apply to Work Release participants). 
293 Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 394. 
294 See Wegan v. Village of Lexington, 309 N.W.2d 273, 281 (Minn. 1981) (holding a statute 
and resulting classifications unconstitutional because classifications rested on grounds that 
were purely arbitrary). 
295 See State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 888 (Minn. 1991) (providing that a classification 
must be genuine or relevant to a given law’s purpose to pass Minnesota’s rational basis test). 
296 See id. at 889 (concluding that the overall purpose of Minnesota’s rational basis test is to 
ensure a reasonable connection exists between the actual effect of the challenged 
classification and the statutory goals involved). 
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